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VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 
 IN BRIEF 
VOLUME 93 DECEMBER 21, 2007 PAGES 207–213 
RESPONSE 
SOME REFLECTIONS ON CUSTOM IN THE IP UNIVERSE 
Richard A. Epstein* 
ROFESSOR Jennifer Rothman has written a long and thoughtful 
article whose central thesis is that we should be cautious about using 
customary practices to decide intellectual property cases, especially in 
the copyright area.1 At the theoretical level, her skepticism about custom 
is at odds with the defense of custom that I have offered in previous 
writings, and still defend in a wide range of tort and contractual 
contexts.2 I am grateful that the editors of the Virginia Law Review have 
invited this brief response, which accepts some of Professor Rothman’s 
main points but dissents on others. It is convenient to divide this 
commentary into dubious and useful customs. 
DUBIOUS CUSTOMS 
Rothman’s basic critique is that the overextension of custom in 
copyright cases has unduly narrowed the scope of the fair use doctrine. 
 
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Peter 
and Kirsten Senior Fellow, the Hoover Institution. 
1 This essay is a response to Jennifer E. Rothman, The Questionable Use of Custom in 
Intellectual Property, 93 Va. L. Rev. 1899 (2007). 
2 See Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and 
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 Va. L. Rev. 85, 85 (1992) (dealing with the 
misappropriation); see also Richard A. Epstein, Confusion About Custom: Disentangling 
Informal Customs from Standard Contractual Provisions, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 821 (1999); 
Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the 
Law of Tort, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1, 1 (1992). 
P 
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As she notes, judges and lawyers have struggled gallantly to make sense 
of the maddeningly vague statutory definition of the defense.3 In my 
view, she stands on very strong ground in insisting that a narrow reading 
of the fair use defense should not be established through the aggressive 
behavior of individual copyright holders who frighten off potential users 
of their copyrighted material. The mechanism that she outlines is as 
deadly as it is effective. The copyright holder—she refers to Steven 
Joyce—adopts an aggressive litigation strategy that leads potential users 
either to back off their original project or to pay the demanded license 
fee.4 The former cases are lost to history, but the latter are then 
(mis)interpreted by courts as evidence of the narrow scope of the fair use 
privilege. She is right to reject any alleged custom that is formed in the 
shadow of improper legal threats, as courts are better advised to make 
some independent judgment as to whether the copying falls within the 
scope of the fair use defense—assuming someone is brave enough to 
risk the very heavy statutory damages available in copyright cases. 
Rothman presents no systematic evidence about the frequency of these 
practices, but her cautionary remarks to judges strike me as fully 
justified. 
Her point must be placed in context, however, for it is critical to 
remember that defenders of custom such as myself fully embrace this 
conclusion. Any custom worthy of the name has to result from repeated 
voluntary interactions among parties from the relevant groups; 
otherwise, it offers no evidence that a purported custom maximizes the 
joint welfare of the parties whom it governs. Without doubt, no custom 
should bind strangers to its formation who lose systematically from its 
application. Yet that is exactly what happens when the threat of 
litigation shapes the behavior of the submissive parties. We do not have 
to worry about what kinds of cooperative interactions generate customs. 
 
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. Section 107 provides that: 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or 
phonorecords . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any 
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work. 
4 See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1912 nn.32–33. 
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It is quite enough to rule out the purported legitimacy of any threat-
induced custom. 
USEFUL CUSTOMS 
The differences between myself and Rothman arise because she 
extends this critique to customs that I think work well in their broader 
institutional context. In this brief comment I shall address three such 
cases. The first deals with the brief use of copyrighted material in set 
dressings. The second concerns the major settlement between the 
publishers and universities over the scope of the fair use privilege, and 
the last concerns the ability of individual scientists and researchers to 
make personal copies of copyrighted materials. 
Set Dressings 
A central theme in Rothman’s work is to decry the use of a “clearance 
culture” that has arisen in the movie industry.5 I understand Rothman’s 
frustration, for example, with Judge Newman’s failure in the Second 
Circuit to accept as a matter of law the fair use defense in Ringgold v. 
Black Entertainment Television.6 That case involved a defendant who 
used a plaintiff’s poster “Church Picnic Story Quilt” as a background 
prop for a combined period of less than 30 seconds , albeit it in the 
center of the screen, but to which no dialogue or plot line was directed. 
This work was a distinctive form of art pioneered by Faith Ringgold, 
which involved the combined use of “a painting, a handwritten text, and 
a quilting fabric,” and conveyed messages about African-American life 
in the early part of the 20th century.7 The defendant’s show was a sitcom 
called “ROC” about the experiences of a middle-class black family 
living in Baltimore. 
Looking at the overall context, however, it is far from clear that any 
industry custom in favor of licensing is necessarily misguided. Nor does 
Judge Newman seem incorrect when he found that the defendant’s 
limited use should not be treated a fair use as a matter of law, which was 
the only point he decided. Initially, there is no evidence of the kind of 
bullying behavior that Rothman found in other cases. If, moreover, the 
fair use defense is denied, what is the big deal? By assumption, there is 
 
5 See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1911–16. 
6 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997). 
7 Id. at 72. 
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no real connection between the displayed poster and any thematic 
element of the sitcom episode. If we read the facts that way, there is no 
particular reason to use it at all, for any other poster should do as well. 
Accordingly, if the custom is respected, one of three things ought to 
happen. First, the license fee in this case will be trivial because of the 
credible threats to use other decorative art in the background. Second, 
ironically, an astute film maker may well ask for product placement 
fees, which the owners of some copyrighted works might well be 
prepared to pay. Or third, the defendant (by assumption) loses  little by 
putting up some other art work that lies in the public domain. In fact, in 
this case, Ringgold had turned down offers for use of the type that the 
defendant made. All in all, I see little to criticize in Judge Newman’s 
nuanced account of the fair use doctrine. In particular I think that he is 
clearly right on the fourth fair use factor when he writes:  
Ringgold is not required to show a decline in the number of licensing 
requests for the “Church Picnic” poster since the ROC episode was aired. 
The fourth factor will favor her if she can show a “traditional, reasonable, or 
likely to be developed” market for licensing her work as set decoration.8 
In addition, Rothman has missed some of the advantages of following 
a customary practice to license. The first is that the industry norm avoids 
drawing the hard lines that arise when any of these variables change. 
When the poster is displayed for a longer period of time, or when it 
becomes a focal point for dialog or the thematic development of the 
movie, does the result change? This custom therefore has a beneficial 
sorting effect that Rothman does not discuss. The cases where the art has 
no distinctive role are cases where the set designer can choose artwork 
in the public domain. The advantage of denying the fair use defense is 
that it stimulates artistic production by opening up a second revenue 
stream. If in fact there is widespread agreement on both sides of the 
industry, then the custom may well advance global efficiency by 
clarifying property rights and avoiding the endless litigation under the 
unavoidably vague statutory fair use standard. After all, it is not clear 
that the defendant should prevail under a straight statutory reading. The 
use made of the poster is, but only after a fashion, commercial; the 
creative nature of the copyrighted work—art—cuts in the plaintiff’s 
favor; the use of the work is entire, albeit for a short period of time; and 
the use of the work might stimulate the demand for posters, or 
 
8 Id. at 81 
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alternatively, undercut that for set-dressings. This is a close case under 
the statute. Yet no matter which way it comes out, Rothman puts far too 
great a weight on the individual case relative to the need for stable 
institutional arrangements to deal with mass transactions. Before 
challenging this custom, I would like to see some systematic industry 
dissatisfaction with the arrangement, either by newcomers or established 
firms. On balance, this industry practice, if established, looks quite 
defensible. 
Class Packets 
I think that there is even stronger reason to defend the various 
commercial arrangements that have been developed over time for the 
reproduction of class packets and scholarly articles, both of which 
Rothman criticizes.9 These packets do not raise issues of artistic 
creativity such as those found in Ringgold. Rather, they are straight 
commercial disputes, involving the mass copying of large chunks of 
protected works, so that a heavy burden lies on the copier to show fair 
use even in the absence of custom. For example, the Classroom 
Guidelines set pretty strict limits for fair use that cover 250 words or less 
of poetry and other prose excerpts that range from 500 to 2,500 words.10 
Rothman notes that these industry minimums have quickly become 
standardized norms “in stark contrast to the open-ended nature of the 
fair use criteria set forth in Section 107.”11 
This transformation is all to the good. Rothman notes that these 
guidelines have had widespread compliance with most universities, but 
never pauses to explain why that result does not make sense. Vague fair 
use tests do not always give an infringer a fighting chance to win. The 
usual course packet contains excerpts from writings of different length 
and type, and no prudent administrator wants to ask anyone to make a 
case by case determination with respect to each and every one of them. 
The fixed guideline provides an intelligible safe harbor and the 
particular word count for which permission is necessary. The clean line 
reduces uncertainty and saves administrative costs. Individual 
 
9 See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1926, 1935, 1940–41, 1953–56. 
10 See Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational 
Institutions with Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–70 (1976), 
as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681–83. 
11 Rothman, supra note 1, at 1920. 
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universities and libraries that are not signatories to the agreement have 
sufficient resources to litigate against the norms. That they do not 
suggests that this master settlement provides useful guidelines to all 
those other schools that did not participate in their negotiation. Nor is 
there a real risk of exploitation. There is every reason to believe that the 
participants to these negotiations had a large enough stake to be careful 
about the deal that they negotiated. Third parties are not excluded 
strangers who are hurt by negotiations that pay no weight to their 
concerns. Rather, they can confidently free ride on the standards that 
skilled universities use for their own affairs, without making any 
payment at all. This is hardly a case in which the nonparticipation of 
these parties flunks Rothman’s representativeness test.12 And it is worth 
noting that the license agreement supplies revenues to encourage the 
production of new works, which of course the fair use defense 
forecloses. 
Research Copies 
I take the same view toward American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 
where the noncompliance with industry custom figured in the Second 
Circuit’s rejection of the industry custom.13 Once again Rothman 
deplores a result that is eminently defensible when fully analyzed. At 
stake in the case was whether each of Texaco’s many research scientists 
could make a single copy of articles from a journal for their own 
personal use. I have no doubt that any individual subscriber is protected 
by the fair use doctrine when he makes a copy for personal use. But the 
cumulative impact changes when the same journal is circulated seriatim 
to 500 or more readers. In principle, the journal seller might increase the 
price of the subscriptions to research institutions and libraries to offset 
their more intensive use, as is commonly done with the higher 
subscription prices to libraries. But this approach would quickly lead to 
evasive tactics (i.e. institutional subscriptions that masquerade as 
individual ones). Or the journal seller could altogether cut out sales to 
institutional subscribers whose low internal use levels do not justify 
paying the higher price. The sensible way to handle this difficulty is to 
develop a reliable source of reprints that allows the publisher to pick up 
on the differential demands, just as a phone company monitors use by 
 
12 See Rothman, supra note 1, at 1972–73. 
13 60 F.3d 913, 930–31 (2d Cir. 1994), discussed in Rothman, supra note 1, at 1935. 
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charging in accordance with intensity of use. The publishers sensed this 
opportunity and created a Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”) (which 
Rothman did not discuss) which facilitated the massive reprint purchases 
at low rates. The upshot is a stronger incentive for the publication of 
journals in the first place. This institutional response removed any 
transaction cost barriers to voluntary sales, and allowed for the precise 
metering that cannot take place if the fair use defense is accepted. The 
metering also permits the collection of revenue to spur production that 
the fair use defense denies. To be sure, it was not crystal clear that the 
fair use defense should have been allowed before the CCC was 
developed. But a good case could be made in that direction because any 
such potential market would surely have been forestalled if the fair use 
defense was recognized before the formation of the CCC. The systemic 
risk here, contrary to Rothman’s contention, is that once the fair use 
exception gets embedded in common practice, it will act as a deterrent to 
some future property rights solution. There are good and sufficient 
reasons then to think that customary practice points us in the right 
direction. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, there is good reason to think that Rothman’s more ambitious 
attacks on industry custom should be rejected. In this context, custom is 
really a proxy for the creation of voluntary markets in a low transaction 
costs environment. If these were inefficient, then the fair use defense, 
which calls for no compensation, might be justified. But the fair use 
defense means that the supplier of the copyrighted good gets no 
revenues from the use of its copyrighted material, which neglects the 
incentive function of copyright law. Rather than denigrate custom, the 
wiser strategy is to develop clear rules that aid in the emergence and 
enforcement of voluntary markets. 
 
Preferred citation: Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on Custom 
in the IP Universe, 93 Va. L. Rev. In Brief 207 (2007), 
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/12/21/epstein.pdf. 
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